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ABSTRACT: The relationship between politics and metaphysics in
Spinoza’s philosophy has been highlighted by Antonio Negri in The
Savage Anomaly. But the determinism of God’s power, implying the
identity between freedom and necessity, has not been analysed in its
political effects. This chapter will show by whom the imaginary real-
ity of free will can be politically employed; that due to the identity
between reality and perfection, a ‘real’ tyranny can be considered a
‘perfect’ regime; how a free multitude, living in a democratic regime,
differentiates itself from an enslaved one, and how its freedom can be
necessary.
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Non Defuit Materia
Freedom and Necessity in Spinoza’s Democratic Theory
STEFANO VISENTIN
INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS IN SPINOZA
One of the most relevant novelties introduced by the studies of the
last decades on Baruch Spinoza’s political philosophy concerns the
emergence in his works of a profound connection between politics
and ontology. Just to give an example, in a recent book Antonio Negri
wrote: ‘The political thought of Spinoza is to be found in his ontology’,
since ‘in Spinoza the political is […] a potency exceeding all measure,
an accumulation not of substantial (individual) segments but ofmodal
(singular) potencies’.1 It is a statement which can be read within a
specific historical context, namely the birth of modern capitalism,
which Negri described with the following words:
When modernity inaugurated the capitalist development, the
new productive forces (and above all the living labour) had to
be subjected to an ancient, eternal seal of power, to the abso-
luteness of a command that legitimized the new relations of
production. From then on every attempt to break this frame
1 Antonio Negri, Spinoza for our Time: Politics and Postmodernity, trans. by William
McCuaig (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 9–10.
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was considered reprehensible and heresiarch […].With this it
was affirmed thatmodernmetaphysics (andwhenwe saymeta-
physics, we always mean in some way theology) sharpened its
political claim. Since then, in fact, metaphysics has always been
political.2
Despite the great relevanceof this new interpretation,which is a radical
innovation in terms of reading Spinoza’s two political treatises, this
chapter maintains that such a reading can be developed in two further
directions: on the one hand, by fostering the dialogue with a more
historically contextualized perspective; on the other hand, by theor-
etically problematizing the implicit (and in some case even explicit)
teleologism of this interpretation. In this direction, an important step
has been made by Étienne Balibar in his seminal essay on the fear of
the masses,3 but there are still some more issues to take into account.
Oneof these issues is certainly thepoliticalmeaningof the identity
Spinoza establishes between necessity and freedom. This identity has
been studied at length by the scholars of Spinoza’s ontology,4 but it
has never received the attention it deserves from scholars of Spinoza’s
political philosophy. The issue concerning the political relationship
between freedom and necessity or, in other words, the relationship
between subjective and objective conditions of collective action, is a
real ‘raw nerve’ of modern political theory. This is because it brings
into question the very possibility of whether humans canmodify their
(collective) lives: in a certain way, the meaning of concepts like eman-
cipation, progress, reform, and revolution depends on the resolution
of the problem of the complex connection between freedom and ne-
cessity.
2 Antonio Negri, ‘Politiche dell’immanenza, politiche della trascendenza. Saggio
popolare’, in Storia politica della moltitudine, ed. by Filippo Del Lucchese (Rome:
DeriveApprodi, 2009), pp. 86–96 (p. 87; my translation). See also Stefano Visentin,
‘A ontologia política de Espinosa na leitura de Antonio Negri’, Cadernos Espinosanos,
38 (2018), pp. 151–70.
3 Étienne Balibar, ‘Spinoza, the Anti-Orwell: The Fear of the Masses’, Rethinking Marx-
ism, 2.3 (1989), pp. 104–39.
4 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984) is one of the most relevant essays on this subject published in the last
decades; but another significant example is also provided by Don Garrett,Nature and
Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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Compared to the approach taken by the vast majority of modern
political philosophers, Spinoza followed quite an original path when
attempting to address this problematic, which depends on the peculi-
arity of his ontology. His provocative perspective can be summarized
by the corollary of Ethics ii, Def. 6: ‘By “reality” and “perfection” I
understand the same thing’:5 a definition which never ceased to haunt
his readers, because, if it is very difficult to accept that the world in
which we live is perfect, it is almost unacceptable to consider human
actions, both individual and collective, as such, especially when their
consequences are negative — not to say catastrophic — for other
people, even when they simply diverge from the intention of the agent
subject(s). It is a well-known fact that, from the very beginning of the
Ethics, Spinoza emphasizes the distinction between his conception of
freedom and the idea of free will, stating that ‘that thing is called free
which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined
to act by itself alone’;6 from this perspective, the consequences which
this distinction produces on men’s collective lives and actions, that is
on their history, must be taken into account.Three fundamental issues
must be highlighted: Firstly, what are the political effects of the illusory
character of free will, i.e. how is such an illusion used politically, and
by whom? This issue is taken into account by Spinoza both in Ethics
i, App., and in Theological-Political Treatise, Praef., where it is exposed
as the dilemma of voluntary servitude. Secondly, given the ontological
identity of reality and perfection, how can a formof governmentwhich
limits its subjects’ freedombe considered a perfect government (this is
the case of absolute monarchy or tyranny, which Spinoza deals with in
the Political Treatise)? Thirdly, as a consequence of this second point,
how a free multitude is created is something that must be understood,
especially how it differentiates itself from a subjugated one and, even
more so, how a subjugated multitude can develop in a free one. This
last point plays a fundamental role in the definition and fulfilment of
5 ‘Per perfectionem et realitatem idem intelligo’ (CWS [The Collected Works of Spinoza,
see abbreviations], i, p. 447; Gebhardt ii, 85). It is worth noting that this definition
is not enclosed within Ethics i, devoted to the discussion of God’s nature, but within
Ethics ii, which takes ‘The Nature and the Origin of the Mind’ (CWS i, p. 446) into
account; therefore, this identity concerns not only the infinite nature of God, but also
the finite nature of his modes.
6 Ethics i, Def. 7; CWS i, p. 409.
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a democratic regime, i.e. of the most absolute and desirable form of
political organization7 (although some scholars, e.g. Alexandre Math-
eron and Riccardo Caporali, have shown that Spinoza’s democracy is
far from being perfect).8 What is at stake here is the new materialist
approach to both individual and collective behaviours, which Spinoza
tries to elaborate: an approach which, anticipating Marx’s reading of
Feuerbach,9 aims to overcome the radical dichotomy between free-
dom and necessity established by Descartes, thus revealing a new
philosophical and political path within the conceptual framework of
modernity.10
THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMAGINARY NATURE
OF FREE WILL
In theTheological-Political Treatise, Spinoza remarks that
Now if nature had so constitutedmen that theydesirednothing
except what true reason teaches them to desire, then of course
a society could exist without laws; in that case it would be
completely sufficient to teach men true moral lessons, so that
they would do voluntarily, wholeheartedly, and in a manner
worthy of a free man, what is really useful.11
On the one hand, this statement expresses the idea that a civil and
political organization is needed for humans to live in peace, but, on
7 See TP xi, 1; CWS ii, p. 601; Gebhardt iii, p. 358: ‘I come, finally, to the third and
completely absolute state [omnino absolutum imperium], which we call Democratic’.
8 Alexandre Matheron, ‘Women and Servants in Spinozist Democracy’, in his Politics,
Ontology and Knowledge in Spinoza (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020),
pp. 260–79; Riccardo Caporali, ‘La moltitudine e gli esclusi’, in Spinoza: individuo e
moltitudine, ed. byRiccardoCaporali, VittorioMorfino, and StefanoVisentin (Cesena:
Il Ponte Vecchio, 2007), pp. 93–104.
9 See Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, in MEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbrevi-
ations], iii (1958), pp. 5–7. Spinoza’s heritage in the thought ofMarx has been extens-
ively debated in the last decades: see Karl Ritter, Prozesse der Befreiung. Marx, Spinoza
und die Bedingungen eines freien Gemeinwesens (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot,
2011); Frédéric Lordon,Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire (Lon-
don: Verso Books, 2014); Franck Fischbach, La Production des hommes. Marx avec
Spinoza (Paris: Vrin, 2014).
10 The idea of ‘another’ modernity, different if not opposed to the mainstream one
developed by Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel, is very present in Negri’s
thought; see, e.g.MichaelHardt andAntonioNegri,Commonwealth (Cambridge,MA:
Harvard University Press, 2009).
11 TTP v, 20; CWS ii, p. 144.
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the other hand, it also emphasizes the many risks threatening the
construction and duration of the same, especially the very difficult task
to transform the choices of irrational individuals into rational ones.
Humans are not born rational and free, as the seventeenth century
doctrine of natural law — especially Hugo Grotius’s — used to claim;
instead, they are naturally subjugated by affects, as the title of Ethics iv
asserts.12 This enslavement coincides with human beings’ impotence
to moderate their passions and with their constant exposure to the
power of external phenomena they cannot govern.13 Nevertheless,
humans imagine they possess natural freedom according to which
they believe that they consciously want what they desire and what
they try to achieve: ‘[humans] think themselves free, because they are
conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even
in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting
and willing, because they are ignorant of [those causes]’.14
Imagination is a constitutive element of human impotence, as it
promotes the transformation of the human ‘internal’ subjugation to
passive affects (i.e. passions) into an ‘external’ enslavement to those
who are able to take advantage of such passivity and use it to estab-
lish political authority based upon ignorance and superstition (above
all the clergy and the monarchs). Spinoza remarks upon this in Eth-
ics I, App.: ‘For they [the priests] know that if ignorance is taken
away, then foolish wonder, the only means they have of arguing and
defending their authority is also taken away’.15 It could be said that
the more humans imagine they are endowed with free will, the more
they are enslaved or at risk of being enslaved. The alliance between
priests and kings instrumentally manipulates the natural illusion of
freedom, which affects all human beings, and establishes, in Spinoza’s
ownwords, ‘the greatest secret ofmonarchic rule’.16 Thismanipulation
12 Ethics iv; CWS i, p. 543; Gebhardt ii, p. 205: ‘On Human Bondage, or the Power of
the Affects’ (De servitute humana seu de affectuum viribus).
13 Ibid.
14 Ethics i, App.; CWS i, p. 440.
15 Ibid.; CWS i, pp. 443–44.
16 TTP Praef.; CWS ii, p. 68; Gebhardt iii, p. 7: ‘The greatest secret of monarchic
rule [regiminis Monarchici summum arcanum], and its main interest, is to keep men
deceived, and to cloak in the specious name of Religion the fear by which they must
be checked, so that they will fight for slavery as they would for their survival’.
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induces humans to fight for their servitude as if they ‘freely’ accepted
a single individual’s dominion who then goes on to become the one
and only reference point for all their hopes and desires. Moreover,
the passivity of such an imagination reinforces the idea (or better, the
image) of a God promoted by the theological-political apparatus, as
Ethics ii, 3, Schol. confirms in an extraordinary analysis which com-
bines anthropology, psychology, and theology:
By ‘God’s power’ ordinary people understand God’s free will
and his right over all things which are, things which on that
account are commonly considered to be contingent. For they
say that God has the power of destroying all things and re-
ducing them to nothing. Further, they often compare God’s
power with the power of kings. But we have refuted this […].
Again, if it were agreeable to pursue these matters further, I
could also show here that the power which ordinary people
fictitiously ascribe toGod is not only human(which shows that
ordinary people conceive God as a man, or as like a man), but
also involves lack of power.17
Spinoza’s criticismof freewill involves a radical calling into question of
God’s ‘vulgar’ image — here the term vulgus, i.e. the common people
or plebs, does not refer to a determinate social group, but rather to
all those who are subject to the hallucinatory power of imagination
— and especially of the view that God is considered to possess an
absolutely undetermined will, the ‘power of destroying all things’.This
alleged power over life and death leads to the attribution of a divine
origin for monarchs, such that their freedom reveals itself in the right
to condemn their subjects to death. However, according to Spinoza,
God’s freedom has nothing to do with such a nihilist representation.
Spinoza’sGod is an infinite power (potentia, notpotestas) strictly deter-
mined in every action, a productive force which actually realizes every
single potentiality, since it ‘non defuit materia [did not lack material]’,
that is, in the words of Ethics i, App., God has the capacity ‘to create
all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest’. To be
even more precise, Spinoza’s God is an infinite power ‘[b]ecause the
laws of his nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing
all things that can be conceived by an infinite intellect’.18 This is also
17 Ethics ii, 3 Schol.; CWS i, p. 449.
18 Ethics i, App.; CWS i, p. 446; Gebhardt ii, p. 83.
STEFANO VISENTIN 45
why one of the most relevant aspects of Spinoza’s republicanism can
be found in his criticismof the superstitious and alienating structure of
monarchy.Nondefuitmateria can thus be read as themottoof Spinozist
materialism, since it means that the infinite power of God is far from
being circumscribed by the finite power of the human mind, which
can only understand it, so to say, ‘intensively’ but not in its entire
extension; moreover, non defuit materia also implies that this power
is materialist and continuously produces concrete transformations of
reality, including human reality, by means of an internal intervention
into the structure of the body (again, including collective bodies).
TYRANNY AS A ‘PERFECT’ POLITICAL REGIME
In Ethics iii, Praef., Spinoza states that humans cannot be considered
‘a dominion within a dominion [veluti imperium in imperio]’,19 or as
those who must not follow the laws of nature as if they were part of a
different realm. This assertion is not only true for common people but
also for kings, who, as thePolitical Treatise points out, ‘are not gods, but
men, who are often captivated by the Sirens’ song’.20 In Spinoza’s view,
kingdoms are founded on subjects’ weaknesses rather than on king’s
strengths, since ‘awholemultitudewould never transfer its right to one
or a few people, if its members could agree among themselves and not
go from the kind of controversy generally aroused in large Councils
to a rebellion’.21 Thus, the existence of monarchical governments does
not dependon the qualities of a single exceptional personbut rather on
the passivity of popular imaginations and affects, which expresses the
(relative) impotence of a multitude which is unable to create a more
developed and rational regime. In other words, a kings’ authority is
produced by the fear the multitude incites in itself much more than
by the fear incited by kings over the populace. This reflexive fear22
comes from the natural (that is: necessary) complexion of human im-
19 Ibid., CWS i, p. 491; Gebhardt ii, p. 137.
20 TP vii, 1; CWS ii, p. 544.
21 TP vii, 5; CWS ii, p. 547.
22 See Stefano Visentin, ‘Paura delle masse e desiderio dell’uno. Considerazioni
sull’ambivalenza della potentia multitudinis’, in Storia politica della moltitudine, ed. by
Del Lucchese, pp. 181–98.
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agination, which prevents the multitude from peacefully resolving the
inevitable disputes and conflicts that arise internally. For this reason,
Spinoza emphasizes that ‘a multitude freely transfers to the king only
what it cannot have absolutely in its power, i.e., an end to controver-
sies and speed in making decisions’,23 in order to avoid the threat of
uninterrupted sedition within the citizenry; this is also the reasonwhy
‘aCommonwealth is always put at greater risk on account of its citizens
than on account of its enemies’.24
Because the conferral of absolute power upon themonarchderives
from a collective hallucination, it follows that the ‘perfection’ of mon-
archies and even tyrannies originates from very natural and necessary
causes that define the history of these regimes, including their birth,
developments, and crises. Moreover, this identification between real-
ity and perfection plays a fundamental political role because it rejects
anymoralistic justification of monarchy that would consider the mon-
arch’s power as the result of an ethical superiority of one man over the
masses, or of tyrants’ authority as God’s punishment for citizens’ sins.
On the contrary, Spinoza removes themonarch-tyrant from the centre
of the stage and integrates them into a wider causal configuration in
terms of a collective subject (themultitude), which then appears as the
main political actor, even within the historical circumstances where
this collective subject appears to be at the lowest level of its capacity.
The imperium (that is, the articulated structure of power relationships
within an organized collectivity)25 is thus always ‘defined by the power
of a multitude (potentia multitudinis)’,26 even when this power ap-
pears to be a sort of impotence or incapacity to give birth to free and
democratic regimes.27 However, this impotence is necessary, and this
necessity frees politics of anymoralistic or voluntaristic overdetermin-
23 TP vii, 5; CWS ii, p. 547.
24 TP vi, 6; CWS ii, p. 534.
25 The Latin term is hereby maintained because translating the Spinozist meaning of
imperium with a single English word is very difficult, if not impossible, since neither
sovereignty (as in Curley’s translation), nor ‘State’, nor ‘dominion’, nor ‘government’
are fit to express the complexity of a political structure which is composed by laws and
institutions, but also by (collective) imagination and affects.
26 TP ii, 17; CWS ii, p. 514.
27 In his Imperium. Structures et affects des corps politiques (Paris: La fabrique, 2015),
Frédéric Lordon points out that ‘there is no tribunal for the peoples’ merit or fault,
there is only the entirely positive measure of their power’ (p. 157; my translation).
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ation: there is neither a God to reward or punish humans, nor a devil
to deceive them, nor original sin to cloud their free willingness to do
good; there is only the natural constitution of a finite mode — or a
composition of finite modes — which expresses the divine power in
a dynamic and continuously transforming historical reality. It is not
a coincidence that, in Ethics iv, Praef., Spinoza once again takes into
account the meaning of perfection in a different context from the quo-
tation already given in Ethics ii, Def. 6. The emergence of this new
definition of perfection is preceded by several references in Ethics iii
to a gradation of perfection in terms of it being lesser or greater, as
in the following example: ‘We see, then, that the mind can undergo
great changes, and pass now to a greater, now to a lesser perfection.’28
Therefore, the concrete existence of minds (and bodies) can modify
their reality— that is, their perfection— insofar as they affect and are
affected by other minds (and bodies), and this is true so long as minds
and bodies are seen as equally enmeshed in this process:
Perfection and imperfection therefore are onlymodes of think-
ing, i.e. notionswe are accustomed to feign [fingere]becausewe
compare individuals of the same species or genus to another.
But the main thing to note is that when I say that someone
passes from a lesser to a greater perfection, and the opposite,
I do not understand that he is changed from one essence, or
form to another […]. Rather, we consider that his power of
acting [agendi potentiam], insofar as it is understood from his
nature, is increased or diminished.29
With this meaning, the word ‘perfection’ expresses the measure of the
power of an individual (or a collective) to act in a specific moment of
their lives, therefore it indicates the intersection between reality as the
essence of a God’s finite mode and the same reality as the indefinite
perseverance in existence, that is, as a continuous and necessary trans-
formation.
28 Ethics iii, 11 Schol.; CWS i, p. 500. See also Ethics iii, DA 2 and 3; CWS i, p. 531;
Gebhardt ii, p. 191: ‘2. Joy [Laetitia] is a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater
perfection. 3. Sadness [Tristitia] is aman’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.’
29 Ethics iv, Praef.; CWS i, pp. 545–46; Gebhardt ii, pp. 206–08.
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THE NECESSARY FREEDOM OF THE MULTITUDE
The third and last point concerns the meaning of political freedom
in Spinoza’s thought, and the conditions by which a multitude can
concretely realize it. In a fascinating essay, François Zourabichvili has
called this issue ‘the enigma of the free multitude’.30 To face this issue
(from a different but complementary perspective to Zourabichvili’s),
a brief summary of Spinoza’s conception of natural law must be taken
into account, in order to highlight the original and profound connec-
tion between freedom and necessity it contains. In the Theological-
Political Treatise, Spinoza writes that every individual is ‘naturally
determined to existing andhaving effects in a certainway’ byhis natural
right, therefore this right is the expression of a ‘determinate power’
(determinata potentia),31 which defines a real and effective space of
action, legitimately included (to maintain a juridical lexicon) within
the infinite effects and connections caused by divine power. From this
perspective, as André Tosel once noted in a fundamental essay,32 the
mode’s finitude is a positive one, since it expresses an operative part of
an infinite power to act. The ethical problem par excellence is thus, to
use Tosel’s words, ‘to become active on the foundation of an irremov-
able passivity’,33 since every human, just as every finite mode, is ‘both
a product and a producer of transitive indefinite operations, which at
the same time express themselves as intrinsic determinations’.34 To
put it in a slightly different manner, the issue becomes how to relate
to other humans who affect us from a perspective which, although
unable to entirely overcome this otherness, nevertheless tries to build
connections on the basis of what is common by promoting both the
internalization of positive affections and the externalization of what
affects others in a positive way. Obviously, such positivity is far from
being absolute, because it is delimited by the power of other modes,
30 François Zourabichvili, ‘L’Énigmede lamultitude libre’, inLaMultitude libre.Nouvelles
lectures du ‘Traité Politique’, ed. by Chantal Jaquet, Pascal Sévérac, and Ariel Suhamy
(Paris: Amsterdam, 2008), pp. 69–80.
31 TTP xvi; CWS i, p. 282; Gebhardt iii, p. 189.
32 André Tosel, ‘La Finitude positive’, in his Spinoza ou l’autre (in)finitude (Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2008), pp. 157–72.
33 Ibid., p. 163; my translation.
34 Ibid., pp. 165–66; my translation.
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and, as far as humans are concerned, by the ambivalent character of
affects and imagination; nevertheless, since every individual occupies a
specific placewithin the spatio-temporal continuum, they also develop
the capacity (in Spinoza’swords, the aptitudo)35 to compose their bod-
ies and ideas— including their imagination and affects— strategically
(to recuperate the military metaphor used by Laurent Bove).36 They
do this in order to resist the external forces which try to break up their
cohesion and which would therefore weaken the common power they
want to build. Consequently, the ability to be active (that is, to be an
adequate cause of one’s own actions), and thus to be free, depends
on the permanent confrontation and collision with the external world,
driven by the striving to modify the relationships towards it (and in
particular towards other humans), to increase our power, and to resist
the power of others according to our capacity. Hence, everyone’s de-
terminate potentiamaterializes within an existential and indeterminate
framework in a continuous variation of its increments and reductions.
Nonetheless, as Ethics ii, 45 Schol. states, ‘even if each thing is de-
termined by another singular thing to exist in a certain way, still the
force by which each one persists in existing follows from the eternal
necessity of God’s nature’.37 As Christopher Skeaff recently noted in
his book Becoming Political, this persistence cannot be interpreted as a
‘norm’ in the legal sense, that is, as the conformity to a predetermined
rule, but rather as ‘the power to transform the conditions of one’s activ-
ity’.38 Here the ‘extrinsic [and extensive] finitude’ of a mode’s power
coincides with its ‘intrinsic [and intensive] infinitude’, producing an
indefinite striving to persevere— that is, to increase one’s power— in
existence.
35 In TP iv, 4; CWS ii, p. 526; Gebhardt iii, p. 293, ‘capacity’ (aptitudo) is defined
with the following words: ‘When we say each person can decide whatever he wishes
concerning a thing of which he is the master, this power must be defined not only by
the power of the agent [non sola agendi potential], but also by the capacity of what he’s
acting on [ipsius patientis aptitudine]’.
36 Laurent Bove, Affirmation and Resistance in Spinoza: Strategy of the Conatus (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).
37 CWS i, p. 482.
38 Christopher Skeaff, Becoming Political: Spinoza’s Vital Republicanism and the Demo-
cratic Power of Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 84.
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The same existential indefinite nature of a mode’s finite power,
which Spinoza calls ‘vacillation of mind [fluctuatio animi]’,39 is trace-
able in the life of amode’s aggregate, since, as Spinoza states inEthics ii,
Def. 7: ‘if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together
they are all the cause of one effect, I consider them all, as to that extent,
as one singular thing’.40 Thepolitical existence of amultitude develops
as a transition from a degree of power to a different degree of power;
therefore, the different political regimes analysed by thePolitical Treat-
ise cannot be understood as rigid and monolithic realities, but rather
as the effects of a continuous variation of the potentia multitudinis,
which produces what could be called a fluctuatio imperii, that is, the
uninterrupted transformation of a political regime into another.41 In
this perspective, the relationship between the power (potentia) of the
multitude and the imperium, as defined in the Political Treatise ii, 17,
can assume two different configurations: on the one side, it can be
represented as an internal determination — so that the potentia mul-
titudinis coincides with the imperium’s laws and commands; but, on
the other side, in specific circumstances, this determination emerges
from the ‘outside’, so that the action of the multitude on the imperium
assumes the shape of a form of resistance to its laws and commands.
Two examples of this second relationship can be found in the
Political Treatise: the first one concerns the aristocratic regime, the
second one the political consequences of the affect of indignation.
Regarding his analysis of aristocracy, Spinoza points out that this kind
of imperium is based upon the clear distinction between the patricians
and the rest of the multitude who are excluded from institutions and
even from the rights of citizenship.42 Therefore, the only instrument
the multitude possesses to obtain political visibility is that of instilling
fear in the rulers: ‘The only reason its [aristocratic] rule is not in
practice absolute is that themultitude is terrifying to its rulers. If it [the
multitude] doesn’t claim that freedom for itself by an explicit law, it still
39 Ethics iii, 17 Schol.;CWS i, p. 504;Gebhardt ii, p. 153: ‘This constitution of theMind
which arises from two contrary affects is called “vacillation of mind”’.
40 CWS i, p. 447.
41 Skeaff defines thismovement as a ‘scalar, as opposed to dichotomous, understanding of
freedom and power that finite individuals [and finite ensemble of individuals as well]
are capable of achieving’ (Skeaff, Becoming Political, p. 86).
42 See TP viii, 3; CWS ii, p. 566.
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claims it tacitly and maintains it’.43 The potentia multitudinis applies
an affective ‘pressure’ on the institutional framework, determining it
from the outside, and thus constituting an apparent otherness which
cannot be integrated unless it is through the transformation of the
institutions themselves. The second example concerns the emergence
of a collective aversion to the ruler(s), due to their behaviours which
strongly collide with citizens’ imaginative constitution:
So for the Commonwealth to be its own master, it is bound to
maintain the causes of fear and respect. Otherwise it ceases to
be a Commonwealth […]. To slaughter and rob his subjects,
to rape their young women, and actions of that kind, turn fear
into indignation, and hence turn the civil order into a state of
hostility.44
The transformation of the multitude’s fear into indignation (which
is defined as ‘hate toward someone who has done evil to another’
in the Ethics)45 produces a radical change in the political order of
the imperium and creates the conditions for the emergence of a ‘state
of hostility’ (status hostilitatis), which resembles the Hobbesian state
of nature/state of war, with the relevant difference that the conflict
is now polarized between those who were formerly ruled and the
former rulers in a sort of reinterpretation of the Machiavellian theory
of humours.46
In these two examples, the multitude expresses its power through
an affective dynamic which is not integrated into political institutions
but rather obeys a very natural law that can be summarized in the
43 TP viii, 4; CWS ii, p. 567. See also Stefano Visentin, ‘La parzialità dell’universale. La
moltitudine nell’imperium aristocraticum’, in Spinoza: individuo e moltitudine, ed. by
Riccardo Caporali, Vittorio Morfino, and Stefano Visentin (Cesena: Il Ponte Vecchio,
2007), pp. 373–90.
44 TP iv, 4; CWS ii, p. 527. But see also TP iii, 9; CWS ii, p. 521: ‘Because the
Commonwealth’s Right is defined by the common power of a multitude, it’s certain
that its power and Right are diminished to the extent that it provides many people
with reasons to conspire against it.’
45 Ethics iii, DA 20; CWS i, p. 535.
46 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince [1513], ed. by William J. Connell (Boston, MA:
Bedford, 2005): ‘For in every city these two different humours are found, whence it
arises that the people desire to be neither commanded nor oppressed by the great, and
the great desire both to command and to oppress the people’. And this situation arises
because the people do not want to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles, and the
nobles want to dominate and oppress the people’ (ch. 9).
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statement: ‘being frightening in order not to be afraid’ (the reversal of
the famous Tacitan saying: terret vulgus, nisi metuat).47 Nevertheless,
the externality of this power to the imperiumdoes not only involve neg-
ative consequences for the existence of a political subject, which could
appear to be the case at first sight, since the power itself expresses the
relentless and necessary (that is, it stems from the multitude’s nature)
movement of the collective imagination andpassions.The institutional
frameworkmust continuously adapt itself to these passions, producing
a collection of different institutions that replace one another without,
however, denying the very essence of the political body. In fact, in the
Political Treatise, Spinoza reminds us:
When disagreements and rebellions are stirred up in a Com-
monwealth — as they often are — the result is never that
the citizens dissolve the Commonwealth — though this of-
ten happens in other kinds of society. Instead, if they can’t
settle their disagreements while preserving the form of the
Commonwealth, they change its form to another. So when I
speak of themeans required to preserve the state, I understand
the means necessary to preserve its form without any notable
change.48
An important consequence of this statement is that every transition is
caused by an increase or decrease in the multitude’s power, and every
political regime can be seen as a determinate (both ontologically and
historically) expression of the democratic natural structure of a polit-
ical organization. Thus, democracy takes on a dual meaning: it reveals
the political regime which expresses the highest degree of collective
power (although it is known that even within a democratic regime
some transitions of potentia are still present), but it also exhibits the
immanent movement of this power within every form of government.
In a similar way, freedom is never a ‘natural’ property of human
beings but rather a process of liberation: being free in an absolute
47 TP vii, 27; CWS ii, pp. 558–59: ‘What we’ve written may be ridiculed by those who
think the vices common to all mortals belong only to the plebeians — those who
think “that there’s nomoderation in the commonpeople; that they’re terrifying, unless
they themselves are cowed by fear”; or that “the plebeians either serve humbly or rule
proudly, like despots”, and that “there’s neither truth nor judgment in [the plebeian
class]”, etc. But everyone shares a common nature, we’re just deceived by power and
refinement.’
48 TP vi, 2; CWS ii, p. 562.
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sense means to be able to use one’s own power, principally reason but
also affects and imagination, insofar as they help to unify every indi-
vidual’s strength. That is why freedom and necessity coincide, since
everyone’s natural power derives from a necessary causal chain which
involves a basically infinite network of relations and mutual trans-
formations. However, another definition of freedom can be found,
in which Spinoza expresses the (imaginary) discordance between the
essential determination of the mode’s power and the existential indef-
inite nature of the same power, and at the same time the attempt to
overcome it both individually and collectively. Given this situation,
how can the multitude escape the threat of an infinite conflict among
humans while promoting the transitions which increase power and
cooperation to the detriment of those which produce impotence and
divisions? How can the multitude become free? In the Theological-
Political Treatise, Spinoza states that ‘we’ve never reached the point
where a state is not in more danger from its own citizens than from its
enemies, and where the rulers don’t fear their citizens more than their
enemies’.49 Therefore, a political process aiming at collective emanci-
pation should begin with unmasking the phantasmagorical nature of
the regimeswhich disempower themultitude’s affects and imagination
— that is, all regimes, such as monarchy, tyranny, and oligarchy, which
are founded on negative passions, primarily on fear (fear which rulers
and the ruled inspire in each other, but also an overall fear which
the multitude inspire in themselves). The second step (only logic-
ally, not chronologically) should consist in implementing common
spaces (spaces of rights, communication, exchanges, even of conflicts,
provided that they are regulated by laws),50 so that positive affects can
find a way to develop into a rational form (since rationality always
derives from a collective development). In the Theological-Political
Treatise, Spinoza calls a ‘republic’ the process of gradual transforma-
tion of individual liberty into a ‘general freedom[communis libertas]’.51
49 TTP xvii, 17; CWS ii, p. 299.
50 See Filippo Del Lucchese, Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza:
Tumult and Indignation (London: Continuum, 2009); Stefano Visentin, ‘From Secur-
ity to Peace andConcord:TheBuilding of a Free Commonwealth in Spinoza’s Political
Treatise’,Theoria, 66.2 (2019), pp. 71–90.
51 TTP Praef., 10; CWS ii, p. 69; Gebhardt iii, p. 7: ‘For it is completely contrary to the
general freedom to fill the free judgment of each man with prejudices, or to restrain it
in any way.’
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The republic’s aim is ‘to free each person from fear’:52 not simply to
guarantee a supposed natural freedom to everyone, but rather to foster
the shift from an imaginary independency of the will — which is al-
ways at risk of being turned into voluntary servitude — to a network
of powerful relationships among individuals who are able to free them
from their fears and illusions, or at least to prevent these fears and
illusions from being dominant. Freedom can thus reveal itself as both
the quest for security and the organization of popular surveillance; as
both the freedom of judging, as well as the resistance of the many to
the oppression of the few.
To conclude, freedom, especially political freedom, can acquire
different meanings in Spinoza’s philosophy, but it is always deeply
connected to the necessity of the causal process generating the body,
the imagination, and the affects of the multitude. Such a dynamic
identity of necessity and freedom causes both the practical predom-
inance of democracy (which is meant as the immanent movement of
themultitude) and the theoretical superiority of a democratic political
science,which is based upon the refusal of any transcendent legitimacy
of authority or individualistic perspectives. This is an ontological and
materialist conception of democracy. For this reason, Spinoza states
that ‘[a] man who is guided by reason is more free in a state, where
he lives according to a common decision, than in solitude, where he
obeys only himself ’:53 in fact, obeying oneself, within the solitude of
an abstract individualism, generates an imaginary and thus unstable
freedom, which must be replaced by a progressive freedom, engaging
all citizens in a common process of emancipation from their fear and
passivity.
52 TTP xx, 11; CWS ii, p. 346; Gebhardt iii, pp. 240–41: ‘From the foundations of
the Republic explained above it follows most clearly that its ultimate end is not to
dominate, restraining men by fear, and making them subject to another’s control, but
on the contrary to free each person from fear, so that he can live securely, as far as
possible, i.e., so that he retains to the utmost his natural right to exist and operate
without harm to himself or anyone else.’
53 Ethics iv, 73; CWS i, p. 587.
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